Mercer Law Review
Volume 66
Number 2 Lead Articles Edition

Article 8

5-2015

Kantian Intuitionism as a Framework for the Justification of Moral
Judgments
Robert Audi

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons

Recommended Citation
Audi, Robert (2015) "Kantian Intuitionism as a Framework for the Justification of Moral Judgments,"
Mercer Law Review: Vol. 66 : No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol66/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Kantian Intuitionism as a
Framework for the Justification of
Moral Judgments
by Robert Audi*
Intuitionism in ethics has often been thought to lack a way to unify
the plural standards it endorses. It has also been taken to have at best
meager resources for explaining how we should resolve conflicts between
prima facie obligations. On this resolution problem, W. D. Ross appealed
to Aristotelian practical wisdom. He argued that neither Kantian nor
utilitarian ethics (the two most promising rival views he considered)
offers an adequate alternative.' There is, however, an interpretation of
Kant's humanity formula of the categorical imperative for which this
negative assessment is unduly pessimistic. This paper will show why.
I am not implying, however, that dependence on Aristotelian practical
wisdom in certain cases is a fatal defect in a Rossian intuitionism.
There are, moreover, many cases of conflicting obligations for which,
even if practical wisdom is required for their resolution, there is no
reasonable doubt about what should be done. In any event, no plausible
ethical theory makes dealing with conflicts of obligation easy or
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1. See The Right and the Good (Oxford University Press, 1930), esp. 18-20. It is

noteworthy that Ross evaluated Kantian resources on the assumption that they must
accord with Kant's view that "there are certain duties of perfect obligation, such as those

of fulfilling promises ... which admit of no exception whatever in favour of duties of
imperfect obligation, such as that of relieving distress" (p. 18). Whatever the status of
Kant's apparent endorsement of this implausible position, no such view is required by
every plausible interpretation of the categorical imperative framework, as will be indicated
by this paper.
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uncontroversial; and dependence on practical wisdom is a central
element in any virtue ethics and, in some ways, indispensable for
practical ethics even when it is guided by a plausible moral theory of
some other kind. My aim, then, is not to eliminate dependence on
practical wisdom but to construct a broadly intuitionist ethical theory
that helps us to enhance both the unity and the applicability of the
intuitively acceptable moral principles it provides. Doing this will bring
more resources to guide practical wisdom than Ross and later Rossian
intuitionists have provided.
I.

KANTIAN INTUITIONISM AS AN INTEGRATED VIEW

In early twentieth-century intuitionism, as in much earlier intuitionist
writings, three ideas have been salient. First, basic moral principles
have been held to be self-evident. Second, self-evident propositions have
been claimed to be unprovable. Third, as suggested by the unprovability
claim-which brings to mind the idea of propositions so basic as to be
Aristotelian indemonstrables-the self-evident has been represented as
a category of propositions whose truth a mature rational person can "just
see" and can know only by such immediate insight. All three of these
views have led to criticism of intuitionist ethics. But if, as I hold in
contrast to Ross, Moore, and others, many self-evident propositions can
be evidenced or even proved by other propositions, the way is open both
to support Rossian moral principles by appeal to a more comprehensive
principle or set of principles and to characterize the self-evident in a way
that makes it easy to see why self-evident propositions may be not only
far from obvious but also subject to rational disagreement.' Ross's list
of apparently basic moral principles consists of eight: they posit prima
facie obligations of (1) justice, (2) non-injury, (3) veracity, (4) fidelity to
promises, (5) beneficence, (6) self-improvement, (7) reparation (e.g. for
injuries to others), and (8) gratitude.3 In earlier work (2004) I have
represented a modified Rossian intuitionism, including two additional

2. See chapters 1 and 2 of my (2004) for references to Prichard, Moore, and Ross's
claims that the self-evident is unprovable and for a detailed account of self-evidence that
indicates why this requirement is mistaken. Consider a simple case: If p entails q and q

entails r but r is false, then p is false. This is self-evident but readily provable. The selfevident is justifiably believable without dependence on premises, but not (in general)
incapable of receiving support from them.
3. See Ross (1930), ch. 2. In ch. 5 of my (2004) 1 proposed adding two further Rossian

principles that express prima facie obligations of two other kinds: those of respectfulness
(understood in terms of the manner of action as opposed to its type) and of protection and
enhancement of liberty. Both are elements in the Kantian intuitionism defended in this
paper and their content will be clarified by examples and other aspects of the discussion
below.
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principles, as a good ethical theory, but have argued that a Kantian
intuitionism that integrates it with a version of the categorical
imperative is still better.
The version I have mainly appealed to is the formula of humanity.
This might also be called the personhood formula or, alternatively, the
intrinsic end formulation. I understand it along lines that, though they
reflect some important elements in Kant's ethical texts, do not presuppose a specific interpretation of Kant. In particular, I have sought to
show that its negative injunction-which prohibits treating persons
merely as means-is explicable in terms of "descriptive" notions, and its
positive injunction, which requires treating persons as ends, is explicable, if not descriptively, then at least without dependence on moral
notions." Showing this is important for defending Kantian ethics as
well as for providing objective anchors for these notions. If the
humanity formula is to serve as one of our basic guides in making moral
judgments, we need a way to understand its requirements that does not
depend on prior moral judgments.
A proponent of Kantian ethics might accept this constraint but still
object that, first, if we adequately understand the categorical imperative,
it will suffice by itself to lead us to correct moral judgments in any
sufficiently well described case, and, second, that as a principle of final
(overall) obligation, it cannot have prima facie principles (such as
Rossian ones) as consequences. 5 Regarding the first, suppose the
categorical imperative can lead us to correct (overall) moral judgments.
This could be because it enables us to weight and take adequate account
of the Rossian principles and thereby the considerations that ground
prima facie obligation-something people with practical wisdom would do
in any case. This point indicates why the second objection fails: the
categorical imperative could be so interpreted as to imply the Rossian
principles conceived as each indicating at least one moral element
crucial for applying the imperative. In applying it to determine our final
obligations, we must, for example, take into account promises, human
needs, and potential harms. Indeed, I doubt that the categorical

4. I developed Kantian intuitionism in (2001b) and further in (2004), esp. ch 3.
Particularly in the latter I appealed to the notion of dignity as adding a dimension to the
framework; but, contrary to the suggestion of Gert (2006), I did not depend on the notion
for the clarity or defense of the overall view; and I sought to clarify the notion independently, e.g. on p. 99, pp. 157-8, and pp. 176-7. For a detailed discussion of Kant's conception
of duty and of the proper treatment of persons see Stratton-Lake (2002), esp. chs. 2-4.
5. One might take act-utilitarianism to provide such a principle; e.g., one ought to do
what optimizes well-being (where overriders are ruled out). On some readings of Kant, the
categorical imperative yields such final obligations. Ross was at least doubtful that any
such principles are sound.
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imperative can adequately guide moral decision apart from taking
account of such factors, and, on the positive side, deeds that enhance
non-moral goodness. Even if it could, it would surely do so better as
integrated with principles according prima facie obligating force to those
and other factors.
Given the detailed development of Kantian intuitionism that I have
provided in earlier work, my aim here is to extend and clarify the
framework in new ways. Addressing further objections will help in this.
One objection is to the effect that the categorical imperative framework
is no help in deciding what to do when, as is common, there is a conflict
of prima facie obligations and we need to determine what obligation is
final,' say an obligation to keep a promise to protect property and an
obligation not to harm a person who is fleeing with stolen goods. A
related objection is that Kantian intuitionism leaves unclear how close
we may come to treating persons merely as means and that, without an
account of this, the humanity formula cannot provide grounds for the
Rossian obligations. 7 I take these objections in turn. The response to
the first partly deals with the second.
Suppose I am correct in thinking that treating a person merely as a
means is roughly treating the person not just solely as a means but (with
some qualifications) also with a disposition not to be concerned with any
non-instrumental aspects of the treatment. (This negative disposition
is needed to account for the force of "merely.") An example of such
merely instrumental treatment might be ordering a timid and willing
employee to do a risky job, with an intention to let the person struggle
alone even if the job becomes highly dangerous. If, as I think plausible,
such treatment is prima facie wrong-wrong-making, in another
terminology-and prima facie wrong even if the act-type, ordering the job
done, is not prima facie wrong in the context, then we have a morally
relevant factor that supports fulfilling a Rossian obligation: roughly, a
prima facie obligation of sufficient weight to yield overall obligation in
the absence of conflicting considerations.
A different example may help: a conflict between the obligation of
veracity in making a promise and an opportunity for beneficence.
Suppose that, by making a promise I do not intend to keep, I would be

6. This is suggested by Hurka (2007), and I have responded in detail in Audi (2007).
Ross (1930) implies something similar in ch. 2.
7. This objection was formulated by Peter Wicks in correspondence. The terminology

to which he reacted had "negative ideal" where I now have "negative standard" and the
objection indicated that the former could create the impression that there is a prima facie
obligation to maximize distance from merely instrumental treatment of persons. This
would be both misleadingly quantitative and too strong.
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getting the promisee, who expects to benefit from my keeping it, to do a
very good thing for a third party. Making such a promise might also
manifest the relevant disposition not to be concerned with non-instrumental aspects of the treatment of the promisee, say the person's
suffering from the loss of an important opportunity when I break the
promise. Let us assume this. The point that in making the insincere
promise one would be using the promisee merely instrumentally weighs
against making the promise or, if one does make it, favors reversing
one's course and keeping it after all. It also supports the promissory
obligation over the obligation of beneficence (though the support may not
be overriding). The decision whether to keep the promise may still not
be easy, though it might be. In any case, the point is that the added
moral ground-that making the insincere, manipulative promise would
be, or would at least approach, treating the promisee merely as a
means-is helpful and potentially determinative; the point is not that it
makes all the conflict cases easy to resolve. That is something no
plausible moral view will achieve.
Consider now treating someone as an end, which is mainly a matter
of doing-for its own sake-something that is (and is appropriately
conceived by the agent as) for the good of the other person. Suppose I
have to decide whether to punish a child for bad behavior by keeping the
child at home and I know this punishment is reasonable but will make
the child suffer. Suppose the retributive considerations, together with
the good the punishment will do for the child in the long run, are just
strong enough to make the choice between punishing and simply
reprimanding difficult, given the desirability of avoiding the suffering.
Now suppose that I consider, prospectively, as is appropriate to making
a moral decision, not just the two act-types in question-which some
other person could realize-but also how I would be treating the child in
each case. Treatment is a matter of my conduct, in a sense in which that
term expresses a three-dimensional concept encompassing these diverse
elements: first, the act-type I would instantiate; second, the reason(s)
for which I would perform the act; and third, the manner in which I
would perform it. There are two significantly different questions here.
On the question of whether giving the punishment is justified by the
disobedience, the answer might be positive. On the question whether I,
as opposed to someone less emotionally involved, should give it, the
answer might be negative. The explanation of this difference requires
analysis.
II.

THICK

AND THIN MORAL QUESTIONS

I propose that we conceive the question of what my conduct should be
as morally thicker than the question of what act-type I should perform.
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One difference is this. The thicker question partly concerns the
fittingness of my expectable motivation in performing the prospective act
of punishment to the context in which I envisage performing it, whereas
the thin question concerns not that, but mainly the fittingness of the acttype to the factors that ground the basic prima facie obligations. The
latter question is roughly a first-person application of "What should be
done?" whereas the former is a conduct-specific version of "What should
I do?" Suppose my concern is guided by a sense of the thick, conduct
question. Here are two possibilities.
First, I might see that, in punishing, I would be acting mainly from
intrinsic motivation to contribute to the overall good of the child,
whereas in simply reprimanding I would be avoiding temporary suffering
on the child's part and would be motivated mainly by avoidance of this
painful consequence and to some extent by a desire to avoid having to
hear the anticipated screams of protest. The realization that one action
would be treating the child as an end and the other would not (which is
not to say it would be treating the child merely as a means) might
properly tip the balance in favor of punishing.
The second possibility also concerns treatment conceived as conduct
but might be such as to favor either the reprimand or yielding the
decision itself to someone else. Suppose I know that I am very angry
with the child. I may still think the punishment is required but may
believe that I would be administering it partly out of anger, perhaps
mainly so. I think, then, that I would be doing the right thing but at
least not mainly for the right reason. Here one might be reminded of
what Socrates is believed to have said to a slave boy: I would beat you
if I were not angry. In addition to thinking I would not be acting mainly
for the right reason, I might also believe I would punish angrily, and
this expectation about the manner of my act is a further significant
consideration. My conduct, then, might well not be an instance of
treating the child as an end. If it would not be, then on that count it
would be morally deficient.
Prospective and retrospective conduct questions
The punishment case illustrates the important point that treating
persons as ends goes beyond fulfilling the obligation of beneficence,
which requires, chiefly, bringing about the relevant good with an
appropriate connection to an awareness of the obligation to do so (this
does not entail acting from the virtue of beneficence, which requires that
the action be based on certain elements in one's character). The
obligation of general beneficence is already taken into account in my
weighing of the overall good that the act of punishment will do in
comparison with the good of avoiding the suffering it would cause. The
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point here (which a plausible virtue ethics might also stress) is that
there is additional moral reason to treat the person with a kind of good
will and in a manner that manifests it. There is a good in the doing of
the right, conceived as conduct; this conduct is not just something done
that is right.
The case does not imply that in making moral decisions, even where
treatment of persons is in question, we must always reflect on or even
attend to how we would be treating whoever is in question. Often we
see clearly what we ought to do, and even how we would do it, without
any need for scrutiny or reflection. There is often no need to raise the
thick question. Moreover, in many cases of conflicting obligations there
would be no difference of the kind in question, on any of the competing
options. Nonetheless, the kind of treatment of persons we would
instantiate in doing one thing rather than another is morally important.
Its importance is not an element in Rossian intuitionism but is
compatible with the core of that position. Taking account of the
difference, moreover-and of what might be called the kind of aretaic
good that my view thereby accounts for (a kind of good in the doing of
the right)-does not require either direct voluntary control over motivation or any greater knowledge of our own motivation than we may be
plausibly thought to have.'
The conduct question, then, is three-dimensional. It takes account of
the moral assessment not just of the act-type in prospect when we make
a moral decision but also of the kind of treatment of persons that we
would instantiate in doing one or another thing in question; that in turn
is partly a matter of our motivation and our manner of action. The thin
moral question concerns simply what act-type is morally appropriate for
an agent in the relevant circumstances. I am of course assuming that
the same act-type, such as requiring a child to stay home, can be
tokened for different reasons. This should be uncontroversial but must
be stressed; for there are also conduct-types. Conduct is not just
instantiating an act-type; it is (roughly) instantiating it for a particular
set of reasons and in a particular way. But, in part because we have
indirect control over why we do things-if only through our power to
abstain from or delay doing them-conduct is subject to moral evaluation
as part of our record.
Conduct, then, is richer than action narrowly considered, but it is also
an element in our manifest accomplishments in a way traits of character
are not. This places it between elements of character on the dispositional side and overt performances on the behavioral side. It tends to reveal

8. The kind and degree of our voluntary control of our reasons for acting is explored in
detail in my (2009a).
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character, but is not an element in character. It requires action, but is
not a matter simply of the type of act the treatment embodies. Granted,
we can give a behavioral name to an act-type instantiated in a certain
way, and many act-describing terms apparently reflect a sense of the
importance of some of these double-barreled types. To yell, for instance,
is to speak very loudly; to pace is to walk in a certain repetitive way.
But yelling and pacing can be done in different ways. There are limits
to the number of ways we can control the manner of our actions, but for
a huge range of act-types we can consider realizing, how we should do
the thing in question is morally significant.
The significance of thick questions can easily be missed. Ethics is
easily taken to concern just what we ought to do. It certainly concerns
that. But it also concerns the kinds of reasons for which we should do
what we ought to do; and, as is less widely noted and sometimes ignored,
it concerns how-in what manner-we should do what we ought to do.
The manner of an obligatory action is not fixed even by a specification
of both the obligatory act-type it tokens and the reason(s) for which the
agent realizes it. A person of moral virtue naturally tends to do the
right thing for the right reason and in the right manner; but one need
not be a virtue ethicist to acknowledge the value of singling out the
three dimensions of conduct as I have.
The scope and comprehensiveness of prima facie obligation
These promissory and retributive examples might give the impression
that the notions of merely instrumental and end-regarding treatment
simply place two more prima facie obligations on a Rossian list and
hence are no help either in its unification or in dealing with conflicts of
obligations. I have indeed suggested that the non-moral grounds in
question-the two kinds of treatment-generate prima facie obligations
and seem to do so "in their own right." Suppose this were all we could
say of these grounds: that there are prima facie obligations to treat
persons as ends and to avoid treating them merely as means. This is
significant in itself. The obligations would be morally important by
virtue of their instantial,as opposed to systematizing, aspects. They
would figure (as illustrated) in many cases that would otherwise be
difficult or impossible to decide in an intuitively satisfactory way.' They
are, however, both different in kind from Rossian obligations, since they
concern conduct rather than act-types. They are also more comprehensive than Rossian obligations. One or the other of them can be seen as
applicable in all (or virtually all) instances of Rossian obligation. For all
9. I leave open whether it is self-evident that the two kinds of treatment ground prima
fade obligations; they can play the indicated role even if this point is not self-evident.
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of the Rossian obligations, many kinds of fulfillments can be cases of
treating someone as an end; and violations of the "negative" obligations,
for instance of non-injury, fidelity, and veracity, are the kinds of actions
that tend to approach treatment merely as a means.
A further point is that the notions of avoiding merely instrumental
treatment and aiming at end-regarding treatment express broad
negative and positive aims proper to the institution of morality-a telos
of morality, as it were. They characterize, in broad strokes, some of the
kinds of evils morality opposes and some of the kinds of goods it
supports. This purposive role that the two notions partly represent is
a significant unifying element for the Rossian obligations.
Regarding the second line of objection, I begin with a clarification. In
speaking of the categorical imperative as usable in systematizing the
Rossian obligations, I have in mind at least this minimal kind of
systematization: on my interpretation of it, the imperative provides three
kinds of understanding: first, a way of conceiving the obligations as
partially explained in terms of the wider obligations to avoid treating
persons merely as means and to treat them as ends; second, a way to
view the Rossian obligations as in some way derivable from it (at least
with some regimentation); and third, a way of interpreting and
comparing those obligations in concrete cases (as will be illustrated
(especially in Section IV)). I have not implied (and do not hold) that the
Rossian obligations are ontically grounded in the obligations to treat
persons as ends and never merely as means, i.e., possessed in virtue of
the fulfillment of those obligations being ways of meeting the deeper,
treatment obligations. Rossian principles can be true "in their own right"
even if they gain support from elsewhere. This brings us to a different
kind of grounding, the epistemological. I have argued for the epistemological (and axiological) groundability of Rossian principles: roughly, for
their being justifiable on the basis of the categorical imperative
framework I have sketched or (consistently with this) of a certain theory
of value, or by integrating the two (2004, pp. 149-50). Their justifiability (and knowability), however, does not depend on the imperative or on
such a theory; and their epistemic groundability in these sources does
not entail (and I do not assert) the ontic point that their truth depends
on the categorical imperative or on axiological propositions (2004, pp.
141-2).
III.

THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS AND THE ROSSIAN
PRIMA FACIE OBLIGATIONS

As to the particular epistemic relations I take to exist between the
humanity formula as I interpret it and the Rossian obligations, the
weakest is that of providing a "justificatory rationale" (2004, esp. pp.
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102-3). The idea is roughly that in the light of the former, the latter
can be seen as reasonable. One might argue that wherever one set of
propositions provides a justificatory rationale for another set, there is a
regimentation of the former which entails the latter or a regimented
version thereof. I have left this entailment possibility open and with it
the possibility of a stronger epistemic relation than providing a
justificatory rationale; but I do not think that such an entailment must
be presupposed in order for the rationale to yield a significant degree of
justification for what it rationalizes. It should be stressed that the
possibility that self-evident Rossian propositions can receive justification
from other propositions does not entail that they stand in need of it:
justificatory overdetermination is a possibility even for the self-evident;
and, for both self-evident and other kinds of propositions, it is realized
in ethics as elsewhere.
It should also be emphasized that one can take each set of propositions
to provide support for the other without holding (as a coherentist might
but I do not) that each justifies (or explains) the other. I do hold the
conceptual thesis that each may help to clarify the other, but the kind
of mutual clarification in question does not imply mutual entailment and
is consistent with various epistemic and explanatory connections.10 My
epistemological thesis here is that insofar as the humanity formula
(correctly) explains, or is an essential explanatory element in what best
explains, the Rossian principles, it receives support. This is because a
proposition's having a certain kind of explanatory power in accounting
for what is justifiably believable and true provides some degree of
justification for it-a kind of abductive justification. The Rossian
principles thus play a justificatory role regarding the humanity formula,
even though they themselves are rationalizable by appeal to it. But this
role is not that ofjustifying or directly supporting the formula; it is that
of constituting truths whose explanation yields justificatory support for
what explains them. Explaining what is true confirms the explainer.
A remaining question is what work the notion of treating merely as a
means can do when it serves (as I intend) as a negative standard which
we should avoid even approaching. The idea to be clarified is, in part,
that we have reasons not only to avoid actually treating people merely

10. Olson (2006) raises (though he does not pursue) the question how all the relations
I posit between the intrinsic end formulation and the Rossian obligations can obtain
together.

He is especially suspicious regarding the compatibility of the specification

relation between the latter and the former and the explanation and (overdetermining)
justification relations between the former and the latter (p. 542). This section should help
to justify the overall integration between the two elements that my Kantian intuitionism

maintains.
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as means but to avoid approaching this. There are at least four cases of
such approach, for a given kind of instrumental act A whose performance
would constitute treatment of some person. 1. There is approachingAing, as in taking preparatory steps to send someone on a dangerous
mission for a minimal payment, while aware that one is disposed not to
be concerned with any non-instrumental aspects of sending the person,
such as physical injuries. 2. A second case is continuing to A, say
continuing to keep an employee working on an increasingly dangerous
task, when one is approaching such an indisposition, as where the
prospect of monetary gains fills consciousness and crowds out moral
scruples. 3. A third case is less directly at odds with avoiding merely
instrumental treatment. It is failing to avoid conduct that foreseeably
strengthens one's motivation to exploit someone. This might occur with
one's employees or in close personal relationships, as where a man
employs a female assistant he knows he is likely to seduce and then
abandon. 4. Similarly, a fourth case is failing to take opportunities to
nurture or develop motivation that enhances the likelihood of treating
as ends persons one interacts with. Refusing to hear about suffering
friends one could easily help might be an instance of this.
Both 3. and 4. also bear on character development. One should resist
conduct that makes one callous in such a way as to incline one to act
with the disposition to treat people merely as means (such conduct might
include doing something that tends to cause treating persons merely as
means to cover up wrong-doing). One should, by contrast, enhance one's
tendency to treat persons partly as ends, and we should do this even
where they must be treated partly as means, as is common in much of
normal life. (Treating someone merely as a means may be uncommon
and presumably is quite uncommon among decent persons, and it is
ruled out by treating someone even partly as an end, which we may hope
is common.)
Taking account of cases 1. and 2. helps in deciding overall obligation,
both by adding independent support to certain options and by clarifying
the moral status of certain prospective conduct. This has been illustrated above in the punishment and promising examples 3. and 4. reflect the
secondary obligation to support fulfillment of a primary one (the
obligation to avoid treating persons merely as means). Moreover, since
treating a person even partly as an end entails that one is not treating
the person merely as a means, developing a tendency to treat persons
even partly as ends, which 4. enjoins, reduces the likelihood of treating
them merely as means.
These clarifications of Kantian intuitionism do not provide a formula
for dealing with conflicts of obligation, but they do show that the notions
of merely instrumental and end-regarding treatment of persons can play
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positive roles both in providing a comprehensive conceptual framework
for understanding the Rossian obligations and for dealing with certain
conflicts between those. I do not claim that every such conflict is better
dealt with in the light of those notions, but many are. A main reason for
this is that in dealing with these conflicts, we may often benefit from
asking thick moral questions rather than just thin ones aimed at
determining what is to be done (other reasons will emerge in Section IV).
This enables us to do a fuller evaluation and, often, to conduct ourselves
better.
IV.

REASONS FOR ACTION AND FINAL OBLIGATION

I have been presupposing that a ground of obligation, such as making
a promise, is also a reason for action, but not all normative reasons are
moral. I have also taken no position on the (normative) strength of
moral reasons relative to other kinds. 1' The possibility of conflict
between moral and non-moral reasons, such as reasons of pure selfinterest, can make more difficult the overall question of what one ought
to do (what to do, if that question is understood normatively). Nonmoral reasons may not only conflict with moral ones but may also
support some moral reasons against other moral reasons. Here it is
enough to indicate how, on my theory, we should conceive conflicting
moral reasons. Some of what is said will apply to conflicts between
moral and non-moral reasons.
To begin with, I take it that there is no a priori hierarchy among the
moral reasons represented by the Rossian obligations. Thus, there are
apparently no two categories of obligation, say justice and beneficence,
such that every obligation in one will outweigh any (individual)
obligation in the other. An implication of this view-a kind of particularism regarding normative ethical hierarchies-is that a moral reason
corresponding to such an obligation is not a priori overridden in every
case of conflict with a moral reason belonging to a different category of
obligation. Note, too, that even on the assumption that a reason of one
kind is always overridden in a pairwise conflict with a single reason of
some other kind, certain coalitions of reasons on one side might still
prevail over any single reason that would always override any one
member of the coalition. If, for instance, in conflict cases, any reason of
non-injury were to outweigh every reason of gratitude taken by itself,

11. A theory of reasons and of the possible kinds of relations that hold between moral
and non-moral reasons is provided in my (2001a), e.g. chs. 5 and 6. To be sure, the notion
of a moral reason is not sharp. For extensive discussion of the relative weights of practical
reasons and, in particular Sidgwick's problem of the dualism of practical reason, see Crisp

(2006), esp. ch 5.
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some of the former taken singly might not outweigh every set of the
latter.
Weighting principles
Given the ethical theory so far outlined, we might formulate some
rough generalizations which might be conceived as weighting principles
that can guide one in dealing with conflicting prima facie obligations,
whether between two or more of the ten I have posited or within a single
category, as where two promises conflict. (I do not take the list of ten
Rossian obligations I have formulated-Ross's and the two mentioned in
note 3-as necessarily complete, but it is highly comprehensive and at
present I see no clear need to extend it.) What follows are several
candidates for weighting principles that might be plausibly thought to
hold when other things are equal in terms of these Rossian obligations.
The formulations are tentative, but seem defensible on some plausible
reading. I do not claim, however, that any of these principles is selfevident or even broadly a priori; nor do I claim that all are implicit in
my interpretation of the humanity formula. Not all are, but each is at
least harmonious with that principle. They might be viewed as
adjunctive relative to both that and the Rossian principles. I will
illustrate these weighting principles in terms of choice among singular
acts, but the formulations also apply where our options are certain
principles of action. They are all forward-looking, formulated with
making moral decisions in mind, but their application is not limited to
prospective action. They can also be used in appraising deeds already
done.
The first weighting principle indicates one way in which the categorical imperative bears on Rossian obligations:
1. Treatment of persons. If two options we have are equally well
supported by conflicting Rossian obligations, then if one option is
favored in terms of our (a) avoiding treating persons merely as a
means or (b) treating persons as ends (or both), then that option is
preferable, other things equal, with (a) having priority (other things
equal) over (b) if (a) supports one option and (b) the other. 2

12. Two points should be noted here. First, although the obligations to treat persons
as ends and never merely as means overlap the obligations of manner (a wide category of

Rossian obligation introduced in ch. 5 of Audi 2004), the two sets are not equivalent, and
an account of the latter is helpful in clarifying the former. The obligations of manner are
performative; the others are largely motivational. This is why one could be treating
someone nicely in manner, even nursing injuries, yet still treating the person merely as a

means, say to preserve for later enslavement. Second, it may be true that whenever
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The punishment case above illustrates this principle. The thick moral
question concerning appropriate conduct is central for 1; and because the
focus of the principle is on conduct-types rather than act-types, it differs
from Rossian principles. It is also plausible, however, even as applied
only to the relevant alternatives conceived as act-types insofar as
identifying them is a reliable guide to the kind of treatment one will
engage in. It should be added that although it is perhaps not obvious
that Kant viewed the obligation to avoid merely instrumental treatment
as, other things equal, weightier than the obligation to treat persons as
ends, this view is independently plausible and provides greater
determinacy for my interpretation of the overall moral force of the
humanity formula.
For some of the same kinds of reasons why it is desirable to give more
than one argument for a thesis, it may be desirable, in moral matters,
to have (and act on) more than one reason. In this light one might give
some weight to diversity of moral considerations, as follows:
2. Moral diversity. If two options we have are equally well supported
by the conflicting Rossian obligations, but the number of distinct
obligations or of types of obligations favoring one option is greater,
that option is preferable, other things equal.
The degree of preferability in question may be slight, but taking
number of obligations or of types of obligations into account seems
reasonable. In part, this is a matter of always giving some weight to the
variety of kinds of considerations favoring an action; but it leaves open
whether, other things being equal, number of types of obligations is more
important than the number of individual obligations. One among other
considerations here is that the number of obligations corresponds to the
number of moral considerations that can be cited in support of an action.
It seems reasonable to give the number of such reasons some weight, in
part because error is less likely and because each kind of moral reason

obligations of manner-adverbialobligations,as I called these in ch. 5 of Audi (2004)-are
violated, so is some value represented among the obligations of matter (including the other
nine Rossian obligations). Might obligations of manner, then, reduce to those of matter?
Imagine that, e.g., being beneficent covers most of the former. Still, being beneficent is not
an act-type, and I am construing the other nine Rossian principles as designating
obligatory act-types, and have stressed (esp. in 2004, pp. 179-82) that any act-type can be
performed in various ways, and that the manner of our performances is often morally
important. (Treating merely as a means and treating as an end are not act-types,
however-at least not behavioral act-types-a point that goes with their comprehensiveness.)
The problem of specifying the connection between the adverbial obligations and the others
was posed to me by Paul Audi.
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for an act is at once a pathway to understanding why it is obligatory, a
potential motivational support for it and, if it is performed for that
reason, at least a partial explanation of why it is performed.
The awarding of grants and fellowships might illustrate this principle.
If A and B are approximately equally good candidates for the same
award, then if the number of the criteria on which A merits the award
is larger than the number on which B does, then-other things
equal-choosing A tends to be slightly preferable. This is not to say one
is required to prefer A. I take preferability to render the relevant choice
rational and morally better, but not necessarily to render every
competing alternative irrational or morally wrong.
It is uncontroversial that the number of people (even other sentient
beings) affected by an act is relevant to its moral appraisal. This
suggests the following principle:
3. Distributive scope: number of affected people. If one of two options
equally well supported by the conflicting Rossian obligations negatively affects a smaller number of people than another, or positively
affects a larger number of people than the other option, then the first
is preferable, other things equal.
This has clear application to legislative and administrative decisions.
A choice between healthcare plans might illustrate the principle
regarding distribution of goods; a choice between plans for wartime
military conscription might illustrate it for distribution of "bads." The
principle might indicate one kind of respect for what Rawls has called
the "separateness of persons." Everyone matters-we are all "ends." It
is not just the collective human good that is morally important. 3. is
also supported by some of the considerations cited in rationalizing 2. In
positively affecting more people, for instance, we may in some cases tend
to fulfill a larger number of types of obligations.
Still another weighting principle reflects the moral importance of
equal treatment of persons:
4. Equality. If one of two options equally supported by the Rossian
obligations treats the persons who would be affected more nearly
equally, it is preferable, other things equal.
It must be granted that since promoting justice and eliminating
injustice may be matters of equality, this adds nothing to the obligation
of justice where that standard calls for pursuing equal treatment. But
this rule would apply even where justice is not at stake, as where two
needy groups of people compete for help not owed to either. If, moreover,
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we countenance indirect treatment, then where two sets of charities
compete for one's donation (as a fulfillment of the obligation of beneficence), and one charity distributes its benefits in a more nearly equal
fashion than the other, this principle would provide a basis for preference of the former.
A sound ethics should give some kind of priority to reducing suffering
over enhancing positive well-being. 13 This suggests a principle like the
following:
5. Priorityof the worse off. If one of two options equally supported by
the Rossian obligations benefits one or more persons who are worse off
than the person(s) benefited by the other option, then, other things
equal, it is preferable, and the more so the greater the disparity in
well-being, or the worse off the latter set of persons is in absolute
terms.
There are many prioritarian principles that reflect what might be
called the stronger moral "claim" of the worse off, and the priorities may
be specified more quantitatively. This principle may be less controversial than more quantitative versions. Once again, an illustration might
come from choices between serving two groups of people or between
choosing between two charities or grant applicants.14 The principle
reflects the plausible idea that the relief of pain or suffering is, other
things equal, morally more important than the provision of positive
benefits.
One could regard 5. as implicit in a proper understanding of beneficence, but that claim is probably controversial, and some theorists might
give it a different interpretation that is incompatible with 5. It should
also be noted that pain often impedes autonomy in our conduct, and the
importance of that point is better, or at least differently, accounted for
by the value of treating persons as ends than by considerations of
beneficence. In any event, explicitness is best served by including this
principle separately from that of beneficence.

13.

This priority of the worse off is related to the positive and negative aspects of

beneficence discussed inmy (2004), esp. pp. 175-77.
14. Insofar as equal treatment is considered in some way proportionate,for instance
to need or effort, the intuitive importance of equality gives some support to the priority
principle, which has results similar to those of the equality principle interpreted to require
proportionate equality. But the moral importance of preference of the worse off is an
independent consideration.
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It is natural to regard ethics as centrally concerned with how we
should conduct ourselves as social beings. In this light, the following
seems to be a natural weighting principle:
6. Reducing alienation. If one of two options equally supported by the
Rossian obligations would be alienating to one or more persons
affected, or would be more so than the other, or would reduce
alienation less than the other, then the latter is preferable, other
things equal.
This principle might apply to a choice between two government
policies or two healthcare plans for a company. Alienation need not be
a kind of injury, so this principle goes beyond emphasizing non-injury.
Arguably, the principle exhibits an instance of according weight to giving
people the sense of being treated as ends or at least of a disposition to
avoid treating them merely as means. Providing this sense may be a
kind of beneficence but it is not usually considered under that heading
and is plausibly taken to go beyond beneficence. To be sure, if A-ing is
morally positive, the sense of being treated as a target of the act tends
to be positive; but that point does not imply that the treatment in
question is a case of, or in any event nothing more than, beneficence.
Here is a plausible counterpart of 6:
7. Coordinationvalues. If one of two options equally supported by the
Rossian obligations would be superior to the other in reinforcing or
enhancing coordination among persons, it is preferable, other things
equal.
No doubt enhancing coordination, for example by instituting car
pooling or a grievance policy to reduce conflicts, is by and large a way of
doing good for people; but whether it actually achieves this is a
contingent matter, and this rule is not simply reducible to according
additional weight to beneficence. Given both our social nature and our
interdependence as a condition of success in much that matters to us,
coordination is an indispensable element in human flourishing taken to
be essentially social. Abiding by this principle seems warranted even by
its instrumental value in contributing to flourishing. A certain kind of
coordination among persons also has inherent value, as where a team
wins a game by mutually supporting plays. Such inherent value would
provide further rationale for treating the principle as a distinctive
element in certain moral decisions.
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Higher-ordernormative principles
The last two principles I want to suggest are different in being higher
order than 1.-7. Both can be rationalized by appeal to the humanity
formula, but they are better understood and can be better justified if
that principle is interpreted in relation to the determinate prima facie
requirements, such as equal treatment, liberty, and beneficence, that are
explicit in the Rossian principles. Both principles concern the sorts of
reasons appropriate for a kind of action or the apparent level of one's
justification for action relative to that of someone (possibly hypothetical)
who disagrees. Both are particularly important in political contexts in
which, as with legislative decisions, interpersonal discussion is crucial
in the process of determination and justification of policy.
Legislative and public policy decisions often imply coercion and should
be justifiable in a way appropriate to both the idea that liberty is
important in its own right as a morally desirable good and the idea that
interpersonal conduct should be justifiable in broadly moral terms.
Particularly in the often difficult task of balancing religious considerations and "natural reasons--which are such that any normal rational
person can accord them some degree of normative authority (which
implies their secularity)-we need a principle that indicates what kind of
reason is needed.15 Here I suggest a principle that goes beyond those
so far articulated in applying where reasons not singled out by them,
mainly religious ones, might otherwise be thought to have sufficient
weight to justify a coercive action:
8. The principle of secular rationale (roughly, of natural reason):
Citizens in a free democracy have a prima facie obligation not to
advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts human
conduct, unless they have, and are willing to offer, adequate secular
natural reason) for this advocacy or support (e.g. for
reason (roughly,
16
a vote).
Here a secular reason for an action (or for a belief) is roughly one
whose status as a justifier of action (or of belief) does not evidentially
depend on (but also does not deny) the existence of God; nor does it
depend on theological considerations, or on the pronouncements of a
person or institution as a religious authority. This notion is epistemic,
roughly a matter of evidential grounding, not a matter of the content of

15. The notion of natural reason needs explication, and I have outlined an analysis, and
in doing so taken account of Aquinas's notion of natural reason, in (2009b).
16. This formulation is drawn from Audi (2000), p. 86, though I published essentially
the same version in (1989).
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the reason. We can imagine a case in which a person's reasons for
action include commitments based essentially on religious convictions.
Consider a promissory obligation grounded in swearing on the Bible that
one will keep a promise to one's priest to oppose same-sex unions. The
secular rationale principle would call for abstaining from coercion (as
opposed to persuasion) in this matter apart from having an adequate
reason that does not depend in this way on religion or theology. If the
material welfare of children could be shown to be adversely affected by
such unions, there would be a secular reason. (The adequacy condition
rules out the appropriateness of certain non-religious reasons, e.g. racist
ones; but the prominence and special importance of religious reasons
calls for a principle like 8.)
The principle of secular rationale can be supported by a very broad
one that also applies to coercion even outside the political realm:
9. The principle of tolerance: If it not reasonable for proponents of
coercion in a certain matter to consider themselves epistemically
superior in that matter to proponents of the corresponding liberty, the
former have a prima facie obligation to tolerate rather than coerce."
The principle is meant to apply where there is an actual or hypothetical disputant who is, in the matter(s) at hand, an apparent epistemic
peer of the person, i.e. (roughly) equally rational, possessed of the same
relevant evidence, and equally conscientious in assessing that evidence.
This principle reflects the value of liberty-respecting which is a partly
constitutive element in treating persons as ends-but it is not entailed by
simply taking some degree of protection of liberty to be, like promoting
the well-being of persons, an object of prima facie moral obligation.
Imagine someone's making a case that certain apparent harms justify
coercion, whether institutional or in personal relations, to prevent them.
The principle of tolerance would call for restraint if it is not reasonable
for the would-be coercer to consider the proponent of liberty epistemically inferior in relation to the issue at hand. Thus, in what might
otherwise be a case in which coercion is justifiable by the balance of
conflicting obligations, this principle might determine that liberty should
prevail.
Each of the weighting principles may conflict with at least one other,
but they may still serve to reduce the difficulty of dealing with conflicts
between Rossian obligations, and in any case conflicts at the level of

17. I cannot explicate the notion of the reasonable here, but I take it to be stronger
than the concept of the rational: what is reasonable is rational but not conversely. Detailed

defense of this view is provided in my (2001a), esp. pp. 149-53.
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weighting principles may be less common or (at least often) less serious,
or both. As with the Rossian obligations, I see no a priori hierarchy. In
any plausible ethic, judgment on the basis of practical wisdom of a kind
that need not be a matter of applying any principle may at some point
be needed. My aim is not to eliminate the need for practical wisdom but
to assist it as much as possible by formulating principles congenial to it.
Might we also have a principle framed in terms of negative and
positive obligations? Might we say that where a "negative" obligation-for example one of non-injury, fidelity, or veracity-conflicts with a
positive one, say an obligation of beneficence or self-improvement, the
former takes priority, other things equal? I suspect this is too broad to
be helpful (I leave open whether some other formulation in this range
might be sustained). Here the problem of deciding what has to be equal
is even more difficult than in the case of the other rough generalizations.
The obligation of beneficence is particularly troublesome. In a world
with as much suffering as this one has and with as good means as now
exist for relieving some of it by charitable contributions, it looks as if the
beneficence obligations of the prosperous are very weighty. Can they be
weakened by making promises to one's children and friends to commit
large proportions of one's resources to them? As these cases apparently
show, a blanket preference for negative obligations, even when other
things are equal, does not take account of the voluntary character of
many of them. It is not plausible, for instance, to regard a prosperous
person's obligations of beneficence as substantially reduced by promises
of support which, with a view to rationalizing the reduction of charitable
contributions, are made (but not owed) to already flourishing children.
This is not to say that promises made with such an evasive aim generate
no prima facie obligations; but acting for that kind of reason is morally
criticizable conduct, and (as in other cases) the resulting obligations may
or may not be overridden. Nor should we deny that some promises, and
certain other commitments, that it is morally reasonable to make to
those close to us foreseeably limit our capacity for general beneficence.
The problem here may not be soluble by any single principle of the kind
just illustrated, and it remains a challenge to any ethical theory."

The status of ethical intuitionism depends largely on our power to
perceive truth by certain kinds of non-inferential discernment. This

18. In (2004, pp. 94-101) 1 have dubbed this demandingness problem the beneficence
problem and argued that the prohibition of treating persons merely as means indicates an
important element in dealing with it.
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discernment may be intuitive and may or may not be accompanied by or
even based on reflection. On rationalist versions of intuitionism, even
general moral principles may be directly (non-inferentially)
known-though neither indefeasibly nor in a way that is wholly
unmediated by reflection. 9 As I have developed intuitionism, the
required power of reason to ground non-inferential knowledge of certain
moral principles is essentially like the power needed for knowledge of
the a priori in general; and the power of reason regarding singular
judgments is highly analogous to the epistemic powers by virtue of which
we acquire perceptual knowledge. These points hold for a modified
Rossian intuitionism, which I consider a good theory even when not
strengthened by integration with an interpretation of the humanity
formula or some other comprehensive principle.
The integration achievable by Kantian intuitionism is supported in
part by axiological considerations. The comprehensive theory that
reflects this further unification of ethical considerations is developed in
The Good in the Right (2004). Even apart from that theory, this paper
enables us to see how the injunction to avoid treating persons merely as
means and to treat them as ends figures both in systematizing Rossian
obligations and in dealing with conflicts between them. The notions of
merely instrumental and end-regarding treatment help us to take
account not just of act-types appropriate to a situation of choice but also
of conduct and of a related distinction between thick and thin moral
questions. The notion of conduct is complex, and the question what our
conduct should be has both behavioral and motivational dimensions.
Answering it requires more than considering options conceived as acttypes or even act-types and the consequences of instantiating them. The
normative framework of the overall view is also enhanced by the
formulation of certain weighting principles that can often help in
resolving conflicts of prima facie obligations and connect these diverse
obligations with such ethically important notions as scope of distribution,
equality, and social coordination. Further clarification is needed, but it
should now at least be clear how incommensurable moral considerations

19. It may be thought that noncognitivism avoids the problem of determining the scope
of reason in ethical matters, as suggested by, e.g., Kappel (2002), p. 411. But any plausible
noncognitivist view must provide an account of what constitutes a relevant (and indeed a
good) reason for holding a noncognitive pro or con moral judgment. How we might know
or justifiedly believe such an account seems to me a problem in moral epistemology much
akin to the kind I have been dealing with here.
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can be rationally compared in a way that facilitates making justified
singular moral judgments.20
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